SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)
Main Committee II - Plenary Meeting
Statement by Mr Bob Tyson, Assistant Secretary General, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for the Australian Delegation
26 April 2000
Mr Chairman
The Australian delegation looks to the Conference to conduct a fair and balanced review of the Treaty that acknowledges the benefits of the NPT and seeks consensus outcomes for future progress.
The benefits of the Treaty are very much in evidence in the safeguards area. NPT safeguards applied by the IAEA provide the practical means for states to demonstrate their commitment to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. Safeguards are also the means by which states can have confidence in the peaceful nature of other states' nuclear activity. The assurance so provided is a fundamental part of national, regional and global security.
The safeguards system delivers much more than its direct security contribution. The assurance that states' nuclear activities are peaceful is the essential foundation for trade and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. And effective non-proliferation assurances, as provided by the safeguards system, are a crucial part of the environment of confidence necessary for progress on nuclear disarmament.
For these reasons all NPT parties have a clear and common interest in strong support of the IAEA safeguards system and in ensuring its continued effectiveness.
Mr Chairman
Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program was a clear and determined challenge to the NPT safeguards system. But Iraq's defiance of NPT norms did have one positive outcome. Iraq's covert nuclear program revealed a need to strengthen the capacity of the safeguards system in the area of detecting undeclared nuclear activity or material. This shortcoming was recognised and is being remedied through development of the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system. The action taken is one of the most important achievements since the 1995 Review Conference and deserves the strong support of this Conference.
Australia is a strong supporter of the strengthened safeguards system and was the first NPT party to ratify the Additional Protocol. But we are disappointed that three years after the Additional Protocol was adopted by the IAEA Board only 48 protocols have been signed and 9 ratified (as at 4 April).
NPT parties must push ahead with achieving early global application of the Additional Protocol so that the full benefit of the strengthened safeguards system can be realised. The Additional Protocol serves all states' interests through increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance as to the peaceful nature of nuclear activities which in turn supports global security, peaceful uses cooperation and further progress on nuclear disarmament. Since the Additional Protocol is concerned with improving the IAEA's capacity to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities it is important that it be concluded by all states including those which have declared that they have no significant nuclear activities.
Many states here will have been approached by Australia in the lead-up to the Conference to urge early signature of the Additional Protocol. We take this opportunity to again urge states yet to sign or ratify an Additional Protocol to give priority to ensuring that they have an Additional Protocol in force as quickly as possible. When a sufficient number of Additional Protocols have been concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol should become the required standard for the safeguards specified by Article 111 of the NPT.
An NPT safeguards agreement is a prerequisite for concluding an Additional Protocol. We welcome the 28 NPT safeguards agreements brought into force since 1995 but underline the importance of all Parties meeting this obligation, which will enable them to also conclude an Additional Protocol. We urge all those states yet to conclude safeguards agreements to do so as quickly as possible.
The record of compliance with NPT safeguards obligations is excellent. In the NPT's thirty year history there have been only two significant challenges to these obligations - Iraq and the DPRK. Both cases drew a prompt and firm response from the international community including strong support for NPT norms.
IAEA safeguards in 1992 detected the inconsistencies which suggested that the DPRK may have separated plutonium it did not declare to the IAEA. The DPRK is still to extend to the IAEA the cooperation necessary to verify its initial inventory.
We strongly support the U.S-DPRK Agreed Framework which provides a mechanism for the DPRK to come into to full compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations and to benefit fully from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We appreciate the good work done by the IAEA to verify the freeze of DPRK nuclear activities required by the Agreed Framework. Australia has to date contributed $15.8 million to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation.
We welcome the recent positive trend in relations between the DPRK and other states and hope this soon will be reflected in greatly improved DPRK cooperation with the IAEA and an early attainment of full compliance with its safeguards obligations.
We commend the IAEA and the UN Special Commission for their good work on dismantling the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. But it is of great concern that, since December 1998, the IAEA has been unable to conduct its verification and monitoring activities in Iraq under relevant Security Council resolutions. Iraq must cooperate fully with the IAEA and UNMOVIC to achieve full implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions and its obligations under the NPT We note that the IAEA conducted a safeguards inspection in January under the IAEA-NPT safeguards agreement.
The UN Security Council was directly involved in both cases of non-compliance. There should be no doubt that the IAEA is the competent authority to verify compliance with its safeguards agreements. But the Iraq and DPRK cases underlined the importance of access to the Security Council by the IAEA Director General and the vital role of the Security Council in the case of violations notified by the IAEA.
Mr Chairman
The Conference should also examine the important area of nuclear supply including further ways to reinforce the barriers to nuclear proliferation without impeding the legitimate right of non-nuclear weapon states to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Export controls are an essential means by which states pursue peaceful nuclear cooperation while ensuring that their NPT non-proliferation obligations are met. The Conference should again highlight the importance of NPT parties ensuring that their nuclear-related exports do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would be appropriate for the Conference to also recognise that export controls are an essential part of the environment of long term assurance and stability that underpins peaceful nuclear cooperation.
The NPTREC Principles and Objectives identified a need to promote transparency in export controls within a framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested NPT parties. Good progress has been made in this area. Two very successful international seminars on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation organised by the Nuclear Suppliers Group were held in Vienna in 1997 and New York in 1999. Both the NSG and the Zangger Committee have acted with determination to improve transparency including preparation of reports to the Review Conference. Australia actively participates in these two bodies, as an expression of our firm support for their role in enabling suppliers to participate in international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the confidence that they are not contributing to proliferation.
Australia has long been a proponent of fullscope safeguards as a condition of supply to non-nuclear weapon states and very much welcomed the 1995 Principles and Objectives clear endorsement of the fullscope safeguards supply condition.
We look to the Review Conference to reaffirm NPT parties' commitment to the fullscope safeguards supply condition. The Conference will need also to look ahead to how supply arrangements should take into account the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system. We consider that in the near future an INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement coupled with an Additional Protocol should be regarded as constituting the fullscope safeguards required by Article III of the NPT and specified as a condition of supply in the NPTREC Principles and Objectives.
Mr Chairman
We welcome the progress made on implementing the call in the 1995 Principles and Objectives for fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities to be placed under IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable. This Conference should strongly support excess military fissile material being placed under Agency safeguards. We also welcome the U5/Russia/IAEA trilateral initiative to develop a new verification system for former weapons material. As well as ensuring sensitive information is appropriately protected, it is a vital step towards ensuring that nuclear arms reductions are irreversible.
The Conference should welcome the announcement made by some nuclear weapon states that they have ceased the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Pending negotiation of the FMCT, we hope that China will join the moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons announced by the other nuclear weapon states. We look to India, Pakistan and Israel to place a moratorium on production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons and to participate constructively in the FMCT negotiations.
Mr Chairman
The Conference should call for the highest standards for the physical protection of nuclear material especially that usable for military purposes. We urge all states that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material at the earliest possible date. Australia would like to see the extension of appropriate international physical protection standards to domestic activities and, to this end, we welcome current discussion of the possibility of reviewing the Physical Protection Convention. We should also note that the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities have been revised and are set out in INI7CIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected). The Conference will also need to address reports of illicit trafficking of nuclear material and urge all states to introduce and enforce appropriate measures and legislation to protect and ensure the security of such material.
Finally, the Conference should register the important progress made on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. Since 1995 NWS signature of the Protocols to the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba (African NW17Z) have trebled from 33 to 99 the number of NNWS benefiting from binding Negative Security Assurances from all five NWS. In addition, there is the real prospect of future progress, including finalisation of a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and further discussions aimed at securing NWS signature of the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok establishing a South East Asian NWF.Z. Australia encourages the members of the South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the nuclear weapon states to continue their discussions aimed at resolving the remaining differences and enabling the NWS to sign the Protocol to that treaty.
Australia reiterates its preparedness to offer, as we did in the case of the nascent Treaty of Pelindaba, the sponsors of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone initiative and the Mongolian single state zone such practical assistance as may be welcome and appropriate, drawing on our experience with the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. We welcome the progress which has been made to date on these initiatives.
Australia and a number of other NNWS have again prepared a series of draft elements on Main Committee II issues. We hope that these papers will assist the work of the Committee and look forward to working with other delegations in a constructive and positive spirit. Australia and Japan have also put forward a proposal on further measures to be taken for the implementation of the NPT. A number of those measures relating to nuclear weapon free zones and safeguards are relevant to the deliberations of this Committee and we commend them to members. Main Committee II has an excellent record in reaching consensus and we believe that this result is again available to us.