SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE THE PARTY TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)

Main Committee I – Plenary Meeting

Statement by H.E. Mr Les Luck, Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

Mr Chairman

May 1 commence by joining other delegations in congratulating you on your Chairmanship of this important committee and wish you every success is presiding over our deliberations.

Mr Chairman

The commitment made by the Nuclear Weapon States to pursue in good faith measures relating to nuclear disarmament lies at the heart of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Continued, steady progress on nuclear disarmament is central to preserving the political strength and vitality of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and remains a key Australian policy objective. This conference should therefore send a strong message to the Nuclear Weapon States that the non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the Treaty look to them to work to fulfil this commitment.

In doing so, however, we should not underestimate the progress that has already been made, nor should we be lulled into believing that nuclear disarmament is likely to be anything other than a complex, incremental process in which each step is evaluated for the security benefits it will bring. There can be no doubt that good progress has been made towards nuclear disarmament, notwithstanding the fact that this progress may not have been entirely uniform or consistent.

Through the Strategic Arms Limitation and Reduction Treaty (START) process and other instruments, the Russian Federation and the United States have halted and are moving at a steady pace to reverse the nuclear accumulations of the Cold War by eliminating nuclear weapons on a significant scale. The United States has reduced its total nuclear warheads from a peak of 32,450 in 1966 to less than 10,500 today. The Russian Federation has reduced its total warheads from a peak of 45,000 in 1986 to below 20,000 today. Furthermore, under START 11 both states are scheduled to reduce their nuclear arsenals to below 3,500 deployed strategic warheads by 2007. Important unilateral steps have also been taken by other Nuclear Weapon States. The United Kingdom has, under its "Strategic Defence Review," cut its nuclear warheads to a currently level of 185, a significant reduction from a high of 350 in 1981. France has reduced its operational warheads to 450 from a high of 538 in 1992 and closed down permanently its test sites.

These are not insignificant reductions and it would be naive of us to think otherwise. Australia acknowledges that significant progress has already been made. But we hope for, and expect, further action towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. The START process is a basis for considerable further movement, and another welcome step in this process was taken recently with the approval by the Russian Duma of START 11 ratification. We now look forward to early and full implementation of the Treaty by both the Russian Federation and the U.S. START 111 will see nuclear warhead levels fall even further and we call upon Russia and the United States to commence and conclude negotiations on this important treaty as soon as possible, and to then continue the process beyond START Ill.

Mr Chairman

The final elimination of nuclear weapons must of course be a global endeavour involving all states. For this reason Australia continues to believe that there is scope for multilateral discussions on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament and we will support any proposal for such discussions capable of attracting a consensus. While for the time being the main onus for nuclear disarmament lies with the United States and Russia, there are vitally important reinforcing steps which other countries can take to contribute to the development of, and support for, an environment favourable to nuclear weapons elimination. This Conference should therefore support in the strongest possible terms the non-proliferation regime as an essential component of, and prerequisite for, the nuclear disarmament process.

It is for this reason Mr Chairman that, consistent with the vision articulated by the Australian Foreign Minister earlier this week, we have joined with Japan in putting forward some ideas for further measures to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. These future measures to strengthen the treaty take as their point of departure a commitment to the full implementation of the 1995 Principles and Objectives. The ideas of Japan and Australia are set out in document NPT /CONF/2000/WP.l.

Mr Chairman, having already considered the START process, if I could now turn to some of the other individual elements of our approach.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty remains a vital reinforcing element of the non-proliferation regime. We welcome the ongoing moratorium on explosive nuclear testing observed by the Nuclear Weapon States, consistent with their signature of the CTBT. Over the past five years the number of States adhering to the CTBT has risen steadily, and with 155 state signatories the CTBT has established a powerful international norm against nuclear testing and is already rapidly approaching the status of a universal treaty. This is a very positive development which we greatly welcome.

There is still some way to go, however, before the CTBT enters into force and this Conference should urge all States who have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible. It is particularly important that all Nuclear Weapon and nuclear-capable States support the CTBT and we greatly welcome in this context the recent decision of the Russian Duma to ratify the CTBT. We also urge the three nuclear-capable states which remain outside the NPT to continue to refrain from explosive nuclear testing pending entry into force of the CTBT.

Five years ago, the Parties to the NPT committed themselves unequivocally to the immediate commencement of negotiations on a FMCT, which was identified as a key element of a program of action to work towards the implementation of Article VI. FMCT enhances not only non-proliferation but is also a vital step underpinning nuclear disarmament. In this regard FMCT was recognised by both the Canberra Commission and the Report of the Tokyo Forum as being an integral step on the road towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

It is a matter of profound disappointment and regret to Australia that five years on we still have not begun these negotiations. This conference should use the strong support which was voiced at the 1995 Review, and which has since been reiterated in the Conference on Disarmament, at the UN General Assembly and in the Preparatory process for this Review Conference, as a catalyst for renewing and redoubling the efforts of all NPT parties in the Conference on Disarmament to secure an agreement which would allow these vital negotiations to commence. This Conference should also call for the speedy conclusion of such negotiations, preferably before 2003 but by no later than 2005.

Pending negotiation of the FMCT, we hope that China, as a party to the NPT, will join the moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons announced by the other nuclear weapon states.

Mr Chairman

This Conference must also address the issue of South Asian nuclear testing in the context of our Review. Those tests struck at the international norm against proliferation, although we should be clear that actions by non-parties cannot be seen as a failing of the Treaty itself. Australia welcomes the efforts being made by the BJP-led Indian government to build a domestic consensus in favour of CTBT signature. We are, however, concerned that little progress seems to have been made by India and Pakistan on meeting a number of the other benchmarks laid out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172. This is something we should squarely address in this forum.

In considering South Asian testing, I should also underline the ongoing importance Australia places on universality of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. With 187 parties the NPT remains the single most important multilateral agreement underpinning global peace and security. Australia welcomes the nine states which have become party to the Treaty since 1995 - Andora, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu.

Ten years ago some 60 states, including two of the five nuclear weapon states, were outside the Treaty. That number has now dropped to just four: India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba. Australia calls on those four states to join at the earliest possible juncture as non-nuclear weapon states and conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.



Mr Chairman

Australia supports the consideration by this NPT Review Conference of possible further measures to provide assurances to non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Proposals for any such measures must, however, be capable of attracting consensus if our work in this regard is to be productive. Our energies should therefore be devoted to practical proposals capable of winning the support of all groups of states.

Australia calls on the Nuclear Weapon States to reiterate the terms of their 1995 declarations and Security Council Resolution 984. In the context of security assurances, Australia supports, consistent with the 1995 Principles and Objectives, efforts to establish new nuclear weapon free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states concerned.

Australia places great importance on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones as a vehicle for providing Negative Security Assurances to NPT non-nuclear weapon states parties. Tremendous progress in this regard has already been made since the 1995 Review Conference, with Nuclear Weapon States signature of the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, establishing the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, and the Treaty of Pelindaba, establishing the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, trebling from 33 to 99 the number of Non Nuclear Weapon States benefiting from binding Negative Security Assurances from all five NWS.

Furthermore, there is the prospect of future progress in this area, and Australia reiterates its preparedness to offer, as we did in the case of the nascent Treaty of Pelindaba, the sponsors of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone initiative and the Mongolian single state zone such practical assistance as may be welcome and appropriate, drawing on our experience with the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. We believe this Conference should agree to strive for early entry into force of these new zones.

Mr Chairman

1 would also like to touch on the issue of transparency in nuclear disarmament. The whole global community - but most particularly the states which have submitted themselves to the obligations of the NPT - have a direct and fundamental interest in nuclear disarmament. In this context, 1 would like to thank the United States for the briefings it provided on the current state of nuclear disarmament to delegations of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in March this year. That briefing built on previous U.S. briefings on this topic - a practice which makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of States Parties on this issue. Australia has appreciated efforts by other Nuclear Weapon States to share similar information and encourages them at this Review Conference and beyond to share information on steps they have taken or are contemplating taking to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and put in place measures designed to obviate the risk of an inadvertent or accidental nuclear strike. There is no doubt that this Review Conference will see discussion about the pace of nuclear disarmament and the more informed that deliberation is, the more productive it will be.


Mr Chairman

Australia understands the frustration of those who feel that the current pace of nuclear disarmament is too slow. But we do not share the view that there are easier or better ways to achieve the goal of ultimate nuclear disarmament. The Australian Government is fully committed to working, by balanced and progressive steps, towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. But it is an obvious political reality that reductions in nuclear weapons - leading to a world free of them - must be made incrementally. Our interest is in promoting a realistic, balanced approach to nuclear disarmament, which takes account of strategic realities and which, importantly, stands the best chance of engaging the nuclear weapon states constructively.

As has been often observed "history shows that the NPT benefits all- parties., even while Article VI remains a work in progress". Australia strongly endorses this view. Progress on nuclear disarmament is vital for the NPT regime as a whole, but it is important not to view the state of the NPT regime solely through the prism of nuclear disarmament. The NPT is too often perceived as a two-way bargain between the Nuclear Weapon States and the Non-Nuclear Weapon States. In fact, it is a three-way bargain, the commitments of Non-Nuclear Weapon States to other Non-Nuclear Weapon States are an essential security benefit of the regime. In short, we gain a vital security benefit from the NPT by knowing that other states are not engaged in nuclear weapon programs. It is also the case that the NPT remains the only global treaty dedicated to the containment of nuclear weapons and to their eventual elimination. In our discussions over coming days, Mr Chairman, we should keep that principle - and the overall value of the Treaty - in clear sight.