SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT) 

Opening Session

Statement by the Hon Alexander Downer MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs

25 April 2000

Introduction

Thank you, Mr President. May I take this opportunity to join others in congratulating you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Sixth Review Conference of the parties to the NPT. My delegation looks forward to working in concert with others to assist you in your important task of guiding the work of this Conference.

The international community has already passed judgement on the NPT's worth in one highly significant manner - and that is in the growth of its membership. With 187 parties the NPT remains the single most important multilateral agreement underpinning global peace and security. Ten years ago some 60 states, including two of the five nuclear weapon states, were outside the Treaty. That number has now dropped to just four: India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba. I take this opportunity to welcome the nine states which have become party to the Treaty since 1995.

In achieving this near universal membership, we have seen a number of states - Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine - turn away from possession of nuclear weapons and seek their removal back to Russia. All joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. South Africa eliminated their nuclear weapons in 1991, thereby demonstrating that the spread of nuclear weapons is not irreversible, and joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

The NPT enables states with nuclear technology and materials to participate in nuclear trade and cooperation without fear of compromising non-proliferation objectives. Without this assurances of the peaceful nature of states' nuclear activity, such trade and cooperation would inevitably fall away.

The Treaty's pivotal role in the international order was given due recognition by the 1995 decision to extend it indefinitely. With that decision the NPT became a permanent tenet of international law.

It is sobering to consider the sort of world in which we might have been living now if there had been no NPT In the 1960s, prior to the NPT, commentators assessed that 20 to 25 states would develop or acquire nuclear weapons by the 1980s. A world with 25 or more states armed with nuclear weapons would have been a vastly more dangerous and unstable place than the one we actually face today. It is a measure of the NPT's success that the spread of nuclear weapons projected in the 1960s has not come to pass.

Australia's ANZAC Day Six Point Plan

Today is an important anniversary for Australia. It is ANZAC Day, the day on which we remember the tens of thousands of Australians who have lost their lives fighting for freedom and a better world.

It is appropriate that today, in the interests of a safer world and on behalf of Australia - one of the strongest supporters of the NPT - that 1 should announce our ANZAC Day six point plan to promote progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament.

The key elements of that vision are:

• the immediate entry into force and the full implementation of START 11, and the early commencement and completion of the negotiations on START III;
• the early entry into force of the CTBT;
• the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and, pending its conclusion, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
• universal adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol and early establishment of an integrated safeguards regime to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system;
• implementation of effective export controls to enhance the long term assurance and stability which underpins nuclear trade and cooperation, and
• universal adherence to the NPT regime.

We will be working closely with others in this Conference and beyond to realise this vision.

Nuclear Disarmament

The commitment to work not only towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race, but also towards nuclear disarmament is a central obligation of the NPT and remains a key Australian policy objective. There can be no doubt that good progress has been made towards nuclear disarmament, notwithstanding the fact that this progress may not have been entirely uniform or consistent.

The nuclear weapon states have reduced the total number of their warheads by nearly 50 percent from Cold War peaks. When fully implemented, the START 1 and 11 agreements will eliminate two-thirds of the nuclear weapons formerly deployed by the United States and the then-Soviet Union. There is agreement between the United States and Russia to commence discussions on a START HI Treaty which promises to cut deployed Cold War arsenals by 80 percent from their peak. The United States, Russia and the IAEA are working together to develop a safeguards approach for former weapons fissile material - a vital step towards ensuring that nuclear arms reductions are irreversible.

For the present the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament lies with the two largest weapon states. We also welcome action taken by the smaller nuclear weapon states that have joined the process, including through withdrawing from deployment and eliminating elements of their nuclear forces. All five nuclear weapon states have supported negotiation of a cut-off treaty to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Four of the nuclear weapon states have announced a moratorium on production of fissile material for weapons.

Australia acknowledges that significant progress has been made. But we hope for and expect further action towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. The START process is a basis for considerable further progress Like other countries we look to the United States and Russia to deliver the deep cuts in nuclear arsenals promised by these arrangements. We welcome the decision taken by Russia to ratify START II and we urge Russia and the United States now to move to early and full implementation. We encourage both Russia and the United States to continue their preliminary discussions on START III.

Let me make it quite clear: the Australian Government is fully committed to working, by balanced and progressive steps, towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. But it is an obvious political reality that reductions in nuclear weapons - leading to a world free of them - must be made incrementally. Our interest is in promoting a realistic, balanced approach to nuclear disarmament, which takes account of strategic realities and which, importantly, stands the best chance of engaging the nuclear weapon states constructively.

Reinforcing Progress Towards Nuclear Disarmament

It is worth recalling that Article VI obligations are directed at all NPT parties, not just the nuclear weapon states. It is equally important that non-nuclear weapon states reinforce non-proliferation and disarmament goals - for example, by encouraging entry into force of the CTBT and the negotiation of an FMCT. Australia has been a strong supporter of both these objectives; many states here will have received representations from Australia urging early ratification of the CTBT.

All states gain a vital security benefit from the assurance that others in their region are not pursuing nuclear weapons programs. Universal adherence to the NPT remains an urgent priority. We encourage those yet to join the Treaty to do so at the earliest opportunity. Those already in the Treaty can support its objectives by maintaining the strongest possible commitment and vigilance against nuclear proliferation.

From both the non-proliferation and disarmament standpoints, NPT parties must adhere fully to their IAEA safeguards obligations.

Australia is one of the most active proponents of the International Atomic Energy Agency's strengthened safeguards system, and played a prominent role in the negotiation of the Additional Protocol to improve and extend the IAEA's inspection and access rights. In fact, Australia was the first country to ratify an Additional Protocol. We want this Conference to support the Additional Protocol strongly and help pave the way for it to be regarded as a necessary part of non-nuclear weapon states' safeguards obligations under the NPT

The CTBT is the newest element of the global nuclear arms control regime, and one to which 1 have made a strong personal commitment. It was, after all, the Australian government that in 1996 brought the CTBT to the UN General Assembly, thereby providing for its adoption. It is disappointing that the CTBT is not yet in force. But it has been firmly established as a powerful international norm against further nuclear testing, and with 155 state signatories it is already rapidly approaching the status of a universal treaty. I welcome the recent decision of the Russian Duma to ratify the CTBT.

We should also not forget that all five nuclear weapon states have signed the CT13T, and therefore have an obligation under international law not to frustrate its purpose In that context, we welcome the nuclear weapon states' moratorium on testing. We will also continue to encourage the U.S. Administration to mobilise the very significant support for the CTBT amongst the people of the United States, so as to convince the Senate of its worth.

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference identified the negotiation of an FNICT as one of the most urgent disarmament and non-proliferation steps the international community should take.

It is disappointing and frustrating that the Conference on Disarmament is yet to commence negotiation of this logical next step on the nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda. We look to this Conference to reaffirm the need for an immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations and their speedy conclusion. Pending negotiation of the FMCT, we hope that China will join the moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons announced by the other nuclear weapon states. We look to India, Pakistan and Israel to place a moratorium on production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons and to participate constructively in the FMCT negotiations.

I should also mention Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, which are another important element of the global nuclear arms control regime and which complement the NPT in limiting the threat posed by nuclear weapons. The opening for signature of two more treaties in Southeast Asia and Africa respectively, building upon widely accepted existing pacts in our region and in Latin America and the Caribbean, is very welcome. We look forward to further progress on the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

Article IV is one of the central elements of the NPT regime and an essential part of the balance of rights and obligations states assume under the Treaty.

The record of Article IV implementation has been a good one, characterised by large-scale and effective assistance to member states through the IAEA' Technical Cooperation Fund as well as its Regional Cooperative Agreements. Australia's commitment to the principles of Article IV has been demonstrated by its active participation over the Treaty's 30 year history in multilateral, regional and bilateral nuclear technology transfer and technical cooperation activities intended to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy depends on the existence of a climate of certainty about non-proliferation. There is a clear relationship between the non-proliferation obligations in Articles I, II and III and the peaceful uses objectives of Article IV.

Nuclear export controls are an essential means by which states pursue nuclear cooperation while ensuring that their non-proliferation obligations under the NPT are met. Export controls do not impede legitimate nuclear trade and cooperation. Rather, they foster the environment of long term assurance and stability that underpins nuclear cooperation. For the vast majority of NPT parties export controls are a help rather than a hindrance.

Australia has long held to the principle that significant nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapon states should be based on their acceptance of fullscope IAEA safeguards. We were heartened by the clear endorsement in the 1995 Principles and Objectives of fullscope IAEA safeguards as a precondition for new supply arrangements to non-nuclear weapon states. Australia believes that we can improve on that undertaking, in the near future, by requiring adherence also to the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply.

Challenges to the NPT Regime

There have been challenges for the NPT and doubtless more lie ahead. The drafters of the regime foresaw the need to respond to changing circumstances by building into the system the review mechanism we are here to apply. It is an encouraging feature of the post-Cold War era that, whenever new challenges have emerged, the international community has strongly supported the existing non-proliferation regime and the identification of possible new measures.

The nuclear tests in South Asia in 1998 struck at the international norm against proliferation, although we should be clear that actions by non-parties cannot be seen as a failing of the Treaty itself. We urge India and Pakistan to choose the path of reducing tensions and averting the threat of a South Asian nuclear arms race. Near term steps open to India and Pakistan include signature of the CTBT, constructive participation in the FMCT negotiations and maintaining their moratoria on nuclear tests. We also encourage both countries to apply stringent export controls in support of global non-proliferation norms. Ultimately, of course, we would like to see India and Pakistan sign the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

It is self-evident that in examining progress on implementation of the Treaty it will be necessary to address issues of compliance. The IAEA is still unable to resume its verification and monitoring activities in Iraq under relevant Security Council resolutions. We call upon Iraq to cooperate fully with UNMOVIC and the IAEA to achieve full implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions, and its international legal obligations as a party to the NPT.

We welcome the recent improvements in relations between the DPRK and other countries in the Asia Pacific region. We hope this will be reflected in reduced tensions in the region and improved North Korean cooperation with the IAEA in implementing their NP`T safeguards agreement. But we remain concerned about the lack of cooperation from the DPRK in fulfilling its obligations under the safeguards agreement. The DPRK must preserve all information needed for the IAEA to verify its initial inventory declaration to ensure that it will in due course be able to benefit fully from the peaceful nuclear cooperation being offered to it through the KEDO light water reactor project.

Conclusion

Over the course of the Conference we will be considering a formidable range of issues and viewpoints. It is clear that not all hopes for some aspects of the Treaty have been fulfilled. We will need to identify those areas and come up with realistic options for future progress. But we must not lay at the NPT's door contemporary disappointments such as the South Asian nuclear tests, the determination of some to test the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime and new security concerns arising from issues such as ballistic missile proliferation. To do so would not only be illogical but would risk devaluing the essential role of the Treaty.

The NPT remains the world's best defence against the spread of nuclear weapons. It is the only global treaty dedicated to the containment of nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination. As such it delivers major security benefits to all States, be they nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear weapon states, or even the four states yet to join the NPT.

However, the danger of nuclear proliferation is still with us and, as we enter the 21st century, the Treaty is no less relevant than it was 30 years ago My delegation looks forward to working closely with others in a spirit of cooperation towards reinforcing the non-proliferation regime.

Thank you, Mr President.