SEVENTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Main Committee III Statement
Delivered by Mr Terry Beven, Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission, Australian Embassy and Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Vienna
(check against delivery)
23 May 2005
Madame Chair
Australia has a long record of demonstrated strong commitment to peaceful nuclear cooperation. As the holder of around 40 percent of the world’s reasonably assured uranium resources, the world’s second largest uranium exporter, a party to 19 bilateral agreements on nuclear cooperation and safeguards covering some 35 countries, and with a significant scientific base in nuclear technology, Australia is a major contributor to the development of nuclear energy worldwide.
Facilitation of the peaceful application of nuclear energy is an essential element of the balance of rights and obligations states assume under the NPT. The IAEA’s work has enabled a great many countries to have access to and derive the benefits of nuclear technology in a wide range of areas, from food and agriculture and human health to industry and resource management. Australia’s pledge to the Agency’s Technical Cooperation Fund is paid in full each year, and we support ongoing reform of the TC program to strengthen its effectiveness. Australia also contributes significant extra-budgetary funding to the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA). We participate in and encourage a vibrant exchange of information and experts, particularly within the Asia-Pacific region and with the IAEA. .
Madame Chair
Cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy depends on the existence of a climate of confidence about non-proliferation. Accordingly, while access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is a key benefit of adherence to the NPT, such access is not unconditional, and is subject to the Treaty’s overall non-proliferation objectives. Article IV.1 of the Treaty makes this clear by linking the peaceful nuclear energy provisions to conformity with Articles I and II. As the Review Conference in 2000 noted, Article IV rights are also linked to conformity with safeguards obligations under Article III.
The two key components that underpin the long-term assurance and stability of international trade in nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes, and which enable an environment of confidence and safety in which cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy can take place, are the international safeguards system and the complementary nuclear export controls regime.
Exposure of the Khan proliferation network has starkly illustrated the fundamental importance of preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, equipment, technology and know-how. Increased cooperation with the IAEA is needed to break down the existing nuclear black-market and ensure there is no recurrence. These developments have also underscored the importance of effective national controls over the production and export of sensitive technology and materials, and international coordination in the application of national laws. Nuclear export controls are a legitimate and necessary means for States to implement their obligations under Article III.2 of the treaty. Far from impeding legitimate nuclear trade and cooperation, export controls foster the necessary environment of long-term assurance and stability necessary for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
It is crucial to ensure that other NPT parties do not take the North Korean route of developing nuclear technology and then announcing withdrawal from the treaty. It should be a priority for NPT parties to agree on some common understandings that will make clear to any states contemplating withdrawal that such action would not enable them to evade non-proliferation obligations. We consider that any notice of NPT withdrawal is potentially a threat to international peace and security, warranting immediate, automatic consideration by the Security Council. Australia and New Zealand have submitted a working paper on NPT withdrawal, and we encourage a thorough discussion of the issue.
Madame Chair
The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee have developed harmonised nuclear export controls to facilitate responsible nuclear trade and cooperation, while minimising the risk of nuclear-weapons proliferation. All NPT parties should ensure their controls on the export of relevant items and technology are of a standard at least equivalent to the major nuclear export control regimes, and are strictly enforced. Nuclear suppliers should ensure that they engage in nuclear transfers only where the recipient state has in place an adequate national system of nuclear security comprising IAEA safeguards, physical protection, measures to combat illicit trafficking, and rules and regulations for appropriate export controls in case of retransfers.
As the 1995 Review and Extension Conference noted, transparency is an essential part of the nuclear export controls regime. We note that both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee continue to work with determination to ensure transparency about their operations.
Significant nuclear supply to non-nuclear-weapon states should be based on their acceptance of fullscope IAEA safeguards. But supply arrangements should also take into account the evolution of the Agency’s safeguards system – notably the strengthened safeguards system. The conference should confirm that a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an Additional Protocol should be a condition for supply arrangements to non-nuclear-weapon states. As Australia’s Foreign Minister announced at the start of this conference, Australia intends to make the implementation of an Additional Protocol a condition for the supply of Australian uranium to non-nuclear-weapon states.
Australia welcomes complementary measures such as Security Council Resolution 1540, which, among other steps, requires states to enact effective export controls. We also strongly support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which has developed quickly as a valuable means for helping prevent and deter illicit flows of WMD and missile related items to and from states of concern and non-state actors. The PSI is supported by over 60 countries.
Countries that violate their NPT obligations by their own actions cut themselves off from the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation. NPT parties should refrain from nuclear cooperation with any state called on by the IAEA Board of Governors to remedy violations of its safeguards obligations until the Board is satisfied that the necessary actions have been taken, and until the confidence of the international community has been restored.
Madame Chair
The gradual spread of proliferation-sensitive technologies, and the lowering of technical and economic barriers to their acquisition, raise two issues of fundamental importance for the non-proliferation regime:
• the potential for states to break out from their NPT commitments and move rapidly to develop nuclear weapons; and
• the risk of illicit transfer of sensitive technologies to other states or to sub-national entities.
The greater the number of states with sensitive enrichment and reprocessing facilities – and the greater the number of such facilities and numbers of personnel involved – the greater the risk of both types of proliferation. The proliferation risks of uranium enrichment in particular have grown over recent years. It is now relatively easy for states to access basic centrifuge technology and to build small or even large-scale centrifuge facilities. Production of a critical quantity of HEU does not require a large plant. The task is even simpler if low-enriched uranium is available: at the 3.5 percent level of U235 common to LEU, already 60 percent of the separative work required for weapons-grade uranium has been done.
We should be clear that Article IV rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not unqualified. Not only is Article IV linked to the first three articles of the treaty, but Article IV also refers to research, production and use of nuclear energy, rather than specific technologies such as enrichment and reprocessing.
Nevertheless, a lengthy debate on the legal interpretation of Article IV would, in our view, be unproductive. We simply ask states to consider the consequences of a world in which dozens of states possess the full nuclear fuel cycle and the capability to break out to nuclear weapons should they consider it in their immediate interests. Clearly, the unbridled spread of sensitive fuel cycle technology would be inconsistent with the non-proliferation goals of the treaty, and it is difficult to imagine a rational policy-maker who would see such a trend as being in the interests of national and collective security.
Such considerations have prompted extensive consideration of alternatives to the widespread acquisition of national enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Australia welcomes calls by UN Secretary-General Annan, IAEA Director General ElBaradei and other world leaders to consider this issue, and we have taken careful note of the report of the independent IAEA Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. We recognise that multilateral approaches have been discussed and analysed in the past, but we also note that the spread of sensitive nuclear technology and concerns about safeguards breaches and non-compliance have rendered this issue more urgent than ever. In our view, the Conference should affirm the need for further study and investigation of workable means for limiting the spread of sensitive nuclear technology consistent with Article IV rights and obligations, including on the basis of the five broad models outlined by the IAEA Expert Group.
Madame Chair
Australia is a staunch supporter of the international legal framework that underpins the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A key factor in the successful development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is the commitment and adherence to internationally accepted standards of nuclear safety and security, including those set out in the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
Physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities has become a higher priority than ever, particularly in light of the avowed interest of terrorist groups in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Effective physical protection is a strong counter-terrorism measure which strengthens regional and international security. We call on all states yet to do so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA’s physical protection recommendations and other relevant international standards. Australia has been an active contributor to work in Vienna on strengthening the CPPNM, and urges all member states to progress final negotiations with strong support at the Diplomatic Conference in July 2005, so that a well-defined amendment to the Convention may be brought into force at the earliest opportunity.
In our immediate region, South Pacific countries are concerned about the maritime transport of radioactive materials through their region. Shipping States can point to radioactive materials having been shipped around the world without incident for over 30 years and the minimal risk of actual damage in the unlikely event of an accident. Nevertheless, Pacific Islands Forum member countries expect shipping states to ensure the safety of such shipments, and many are pressing for a guarantee of compensation should they suffer economic loss in the event of an incident, even one in which no radiation is released. As a member of the Pacific Islands Forum, Australia will continue to encourage, and participate in, discussions between Forum members and shipping States to explore ways to address particular concerns of regional States. We welcome the IAEA’s contribution on transport issues and endorse the IAEA Action Plan on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2004.
Madame Chair
Australia is proud of its contribution to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The commitment of NPT parties to the highest standards of non-proliferation, nuclear safety and security remains central to the climate of confidence and trust essential for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.